Antidumping (AD) duties are often calculated as the difference between the foreign firm's product price in its own market and its product price in the export market. Additionally, AD laws allow for recalculation of the AD duties over time in what are known as the administrative review process. These features of AD policy imply that foreign firms that face AD trade protection must solve a dynamic pricing problem, and this has not been considered by previous literature. In response, this paper models the dynamic pricing problem of firms facing possible AD duties and empirically examines some of the model's implications.
Introduction
Recent research on antidumping (AD) protection policies has revealed that the institutional structure surrounding the determination and administration of AD duties makes analysis of this form of trade policy quite interesting and complicated. On the surface, AD duties are simple ad valorem tariffs, intended to reflect the extent to which the foreign firm was dumping in the export destination market. The calculated degree of dumping (or dumping "margin") is the difference between a "normal" or "fair" value for the product and the price it is charging in the export market, and there is a positive dumping margin any time the export price is below the "normal" value. The U.S.
Department of Commerce (USDOC) primarily uses the price charged by the foreign firm in its own market as the estimate of "normal" value in dumping calculations.
Importantly, this means that the AD duty becomes a function of prices chosen by the firm across its export and own home market. In addition, after an AD duty comes into place there is the potential for continuous recalculation of the AD duty over time in what are called administrative reviews. These administrative reviews occur at the request of the foreign firm or other interested parties and, in fact, the vast majority of U.S. AD duties are reviewed at least once subsequent to a case. The method of AD duty calculation and administrative review process presents a foreign firm with a dynamic pricing problem that has not been explored before and will be the focus of this paper.
While previous research has not considered this dynamic pricing problem, there have been important examinations of how the structure of AD investigations affects economic outcomes, including price determination. Staiger and Wolak (1994) and Krupp and Pollard (1996) focus on how investigation "events" (i.e., the filing of the petition, public findings of the USDOC, terminations, etc.) affect import and pricing behavior by foreign firms. Staiger and Wolak focus mainly on import volume and price changes during U.S. AD investigations filed from 1980-1986. They find that changes in prices and import volumes during the investigation depend on whether the domestic industry has filed the case to merely harass the foreign firm (they call these domestic petitioners "process" filers) or to gain actual trade protection ("outcome" filers). To the extent that they examine changes in variables after the investigation, they do not consider the administrative review process. Krupp and Pollard use detailed data on chemical products subject to U.S. AD investigations to focus on changes in import volumes due to investigation events, as well as eventual AD duties. DeVault (1996) examines data on the changes in U.S. AD duties from the administrative review process. His empirical work uncovers factors that lead to lower AD duties over time, but he does not integrate these observations within a formal theoretical framework. Finally, Blonigen and Haynes (1999) examine pass-through of exchange rates and antidumping duties to U.S. import prices for products involved in U.S. AD investigations. They present a one-period model of pricing for a firm subject to an AD duty to motivate their empirical work, which finds that exchange rate pass-through is substantially altered for their sample of Canadian steel products. This paper's contribution is to more seriously consider the dynamic pricing problem firms face in the presence of AD investigations and duties. We first set up a formal theoretical model and then use data on AD duty changes from U.S. administrative reviews to test some of the model's implications. In the model, a foreign firm is solving a dynamic optimization problem, where the current period price (p) affects the antidumping duty in the next period (T +1 ). Specifically, the lower the current period price is relative to the fair value of the product (p f ), the higher the next period dumping duty (T +1 = p f /p) will be. Given that the foreign firm has a static incentive to dump its product (the static profit maximizing price is less than the fair value), the firm needs to balance the loss in the current period from setting price higher than its static optimal against the gains in the future discounted payoff from having a lower dumping duty in the next period.
Under certain (without uncertainty) enforcement of anti-dumping policy, the dynamic programming analysis yields a surprising result with respect to the optimal pricing path. When a foreign firm dumps (setting its price lower than the fair value) in the initial period, then the firm will dump more over time (setting the price lower over time)
until the price reaches a steady state value. Dumping duties will increase (or at least never decrease) through the review process! Knowing how an increase in the dumping duty affects the balance between the loss in the current profit and the gain in the future discounted profit associated with current pricing is the key to understanding this result. In particular, when the dumping duty increases, the rate of current-profit loss associated with pricing higher than the static optimal price increases, implying higher costs of reducing the dumping margin for a higher current dumping duty. Thus, once a firm dumps in the initial period free of any dumping duty, the firm will face a steeper trade-off between the current profit loss and the future gain with a dumping duty being imposed in the next period. This will lead the firm to choose a price that is at least as low as the initial price.
However, it is well known that the enforcement of anti-dumping policy is far from certain. Particularly, antidumping investigations are often withdrawn before they reach final determination. In fact, many of these cases are resolved in the form of voluntary export restraints (VERs) or other collusive agreements (e.g., see Prusa, 1992) . To analyze how this uncertain enforcement affects the dynamic pricing behavior, we modify the model to have a dumping firm face some probability of getting an initial dumping duty that is likely less than one, while assuming that the following review process will be enforced with certainty. In this case, the analysis shows that the foreign firm may try to reduce the dumping duty through the review process (setting higher price over time once the firm needs to pay the dumping duties) when the probability of getting the initial dumping duty is low enough. We can explain this result as follows. As the probability of getting the initial dumping duty becomes smaller, the foreign firm has an incentive to set its price closer to its static optimum. But, when it is actually found to be dumping (despite its low probability) and needs to pay the dumping duty, the initial dumping price can be lower than the steady state value under certain enforcement (note that certain enforcement is assumed in the review process). If this is the case, then the foreign firm will set its price higher over time until the price reaches the steady state value.
The model yields a number of interesting results with empirical implications. We present some preliminary empirical evidence for one of these implications -namely, that a higher ex ante probability that a case will be terminated should be correlated with a higher probability that we will observe an AD duty reduction from administrative reviews. We use a sample of all firm-product combinations subject to U.S. affirmative AD decisions and AD duties for AD investigations filed between 1980 and 1991 to perform some initial tests. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis. In particular, a higher ex ante probability of termination leads to substantial increase in the probability that an affirmative case will see AD duty reduction.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some relevant details of U.S. AD trade protection and the administrative review process.
Section 3 provides a formal dynamic pricing model and our main propositions. Section 4 then describes our empirical analysis and a final section concludes.
Salient Features of U.S. Antidumping Law and Administration
This section provides a brief overview of the relevant details connected with U.S.
AD investigations and administrative reviews. The U.S. AD laws are administered by the USDOC and U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), each with distinct roles in the process. When an AD petition is filed, the USDOC determines whether the subject product is being sold at "less than fair value" in the United States. In contrast, the USITC determines whether the relevant U.S. domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, by reason of the imports subject to its investigation.
The calculation of the dumping margin by the USDOC is usually not straightforward and revolves around how the USDOC measures what should be the "fair value" of the product sold in the United States. Selling a product in the United States at less than "fair value" is the definition of dumping and the difference between the U.S.
price and "fair value" is the dumping margin. In theory, the USDOC defines "fair value"
as the exporting firm's price for the same product in its own home market. However, if the firm's home market sales are deemed inadequate, then the USDOC may base "fair value" on the exporting firm's prices in third country markets or on a constructed value for the product using manufacturing costs, selling, general and administrative costs, profits and packaging costs. These calculations obviously involve highly detailed and confidential data on the transactions of the investigated firm, which are requested by USDOC from the investigated firm. If the investigated firm does not comply sufficiently, the USDOC will turn to using the "best information available," which is often information supplied by the U.S. firms that filed the petition.
If an affirmative preliminary determination is made by both the USDOC and the USITC, which may take up to 160days, then the importer must post a cash deposit, a bond or other security for each entry equal to the preliminary margin determined by the USDOC. This requirement stays in effect until either the USDOC or the USITC makes a negative final determination, which again may take another 120 days. If an affirmative final determination is made by both the USITC and USDOC, then USDOC issues an AD order to levy a duty equal to the estimated dumping margin on the subject product.
When a subject foreign product enters the United States, the importer must pay Customs a cash deposit equal to the margin times the value of the subject product.
However, these cash deposits do not necessarily represent the final amount of duties to be assessed on the subject imports. Rather, the margin determined in USDOC's final investigation is only used as a basis for estimating the duty liability of the importer. The actual liability of the importer may be determined in subsequent years by the USDOC.
Before 1984, this was accomplished by automatic yearly administrative reviews by the USDOC. However, since 1984, such reviews have become voluntary; that is, unless an interested party requests a review, the duties assessed are those found in USDOC's final determination (or most recent administrative review). An administrative review serves two purposes. First, it adjusts the margin on subject imports to reflect changes in the difference between the foreign firm's U.S. price and the fair value so that the importer pays an adjusted cash deposit based on the reviewed margin until the next administrative review. Second, it makes AD duties to be retroactive: if a review determines that the margin during the review period is different from the previous margin used as a basis for the importer's cash deposit, a bill (or refund) in the amount of the difference plus interest is assessed (or rebated). This administrative review process is important for the analysis in section 3 and 4 below.
The Theoretical Models
This section develops models of dynamic pricing of a foreign firm in the presence of antidumping policy described in the preceding section. We will first analyze the case where the policy is enforced without uncertainty and then analyze how allowing uncertain enforcement affects the optimal pricing path under the antidumping policy.
Basic Model
We assume that a foreign firm may sell its products both in foreign and domestic markets and these markets are separated from each other so that price discrimination is possible across the markets. However, when the foreign firm chooses its price in the domestic market, p, lower than its price in the foreign market, p f , the foreign firm faces an antidumping duty, T (≥1) such that pT = p f in the domestic market. When the foreign firm changes p or p f , this dumping duty is subject to change through administrative review process, according to pT = p f .
As the initial dumping determination and the following administrative review are far from instantaneous to changes in the prices, the foreign firm faces a dynamic price choice problem. To analyze this problem, we use an infinite horizon model in which the consumers' tastes are the same in each period. For simplicity, we assume that the change in the dumping duty lags one period to changes in the price, 1 Let c be the foreign firm's constant marginal production cost and q(p c ) be its per-period domestic demand function with p c (= pT) being the consumer price. Then, the discounted profit from the domestic market for the foreign firm in period k is given by
, meaning that the imports will be prohibited from k+1 period on.
2
The dynamic price choice problem of the foreign firm would involve choosing the sequence of its foreign prices, as well as the sequence of its domestic prices. To characterize the optimal sequence for the domestic prices, however, we can focus on the problem of maximizing the discounted profit from the domestic market by choosing the optimal domestic price sequence for a given f 0 p (optimally chosen in the initial period). This is because only the initial foreign price will matter in determining all subsequent antidumping duties for the domestic market.
Therefore, we analyze the following optimization problem taking f 0 p and
or the corresponding dynamic programming problem:
2 It is clear from this discounted payoff that the administrative review is not retroactive in this basic model. We can analyze the effect of introducing "retroactiveness" in the administrative review process by analyzing the following problem:
However, it can be shown that analyzing the above problem will generate qualitatively the same result as the basic model (without retroactiveness) regarding the dynamic pricing behavior of the foreign firm. From now on, thus, we will restrict our attention to the basic model. This basic model also confirms the structure of the EU's antidumping law, which lacks retroactiveness in its administrative review process.
under proper conditions that guarantee the equivalence between the above two problems.
Denote the supremum function resulting from (2) by V*(p -1 ) and the value function satisfying (3) by V(p -1 ). Given the existence, uniqueness, and equivalence of V*(p -1 ) and V(p -1 ), we can describe the optimal pricing path of the foreign firm facing the antidumping policy by analyzing the optimal policy correspondence G:
Lemma 1 specifies the conditions for such analysis. The lemma shows that we can use the dynamic programming problem (3) for almost any reasonable demand functions to analyze the problem (2). For further characterization of G(p) and V(p), however, we need to introduce more restraints on q(p c ): Denote max{G(p)} by h(p) and min{G(p)} by l(p). Then, we can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The optimal correspondence G(p) is non-decreasing in p in the sense that
According to Lemma 3, the foreign firm's optimal price in the current period does not increase when the current anti-dumping duty increases. an increase in the dumping duty makes setting the current period higher than l(p') even less attractive than before. Note that the foreign firm tries to balance between the current period profit loss against the future discounted profit gain in setting the current price higher than its static optimum. Because a higher current duty will raises the current period profit loss associated with higher prices, it induces the foreign firm to choose a lower current price than before, if not a equal price.
Based on Lemma 1-3, we can now characterize the dynamic pricing behavior of the foreign firm in the presence of antidumping policy as follows: 
As mentioned earlier the optimal price is set to balance the current period profit loss against the discounted profit gain in the next period. Therefore, we will observe the foreign firm to dump its products, only when the foreign firm values the current period profit high enough relative to its future discounted profit (δ < δ c ). If the foreign firm dumps in the initial period, then rather surprisingly the foreign firm will never try to reduce its dumping margin through the administrative review process, according to Proposition 1. For example, when G(p;δ < δ c ) is as in Figure 2 p /p * ). The optimal policy correspondence may not behave smoothly as illustrated in Figure 2 (b), but we can easily check that the foreign firm will never reduce its dumping margin through the review process.
We can explain this result in the following way. If a foreign firm dumps in the initial period, this behavior reveals that the firm values its current period profit gain associated with pricing closer to its static optimum relatively more than the loss in the future discounted profit associated with incurring a positive dumping duty in the next period. Then, in the next period with a positive dumping duty, (A3) assures that the current profit loss associate with higher pricing gets bigger than before, inducing the firm to reduce its price even further or to set the same price. Thus, the fact that a foreign firm dumps in the initial period despite the dynamic costs from future dumping duties, reveals the firm's dynamic preference toward dumping.
Proposition 1 generates a specific empirical prediction: foreign firms will never try to reduce its dumping duties through the administrative review process. Even a brief look at the U.S. anti-dumping review data can tell us that this prediction is largely wrong; about 45% of the initial dumping duties have been reduced through the review process during 1980 -1991 period. We will introduce uncertainty in the enforcement of antidumping policy into the model, which may induce the foreign firms to reduce their dumping duties through the review.
The Model under Imperfect Enforcement of Anti-dumping Policy
A large portion of U.S. anti-dumping cases has been terminated, without reaching the final determination, in the forms of negative injury determinations, withdrawn cases based on agreements between domestic and foreign firms (often VERs), and etc. p ) in the absence of any current dumping duty (T i =1). We assume that the foreign firm will have T = 1 in the next period with probability of (1 − Pr), implying that the initial enforcement takes two extreme forms;
perfect enforcement (T = f 0 p /p) with probability Pr or no enforcement (T=1) with probability (Pr − 1). We also assume that once the antidumping duty is initially imposed, the following administrative reviews will be perfectly enforced, such as
Finally, we assume that Pr is not a function of p (the price chosen in the absence dumping duties), even though Pr may differ across different foreign firms belong to different industries.
Given the uncertain enforcement of anti-dumping policy described above, the discounted expected payoff in the initial period, EV( f 0 p ) will be given by: Note that when no-enforcement is realized, then the foreign firm will face the same problem as its initial problem regarding its choice of e i p for i = 1, 2, 3, … . Thus, the optimal price will be identical to the initial optimal price as long as the anti-dumping duty is not imposed. Denote this initial optimal choice to be the solution to the problem in (3). With these facts in mind, we can rewrite the discounted expected payoff in the initial period as:
Because Pr is not a function of E 0 p , the dynamic pricing problem under uncertain enforcement is reduce to find out p 0 satisfying:
and the optimal pricing path under the administrative review process will follow G( 
iii) If V(p) is strictly increasing in p ∈ (c, It is easy to understand why E 0 p is non-decreasing in Pr. Due to the same reason as under the certain enforcement, the optimal price (in the absence of dumping duty) E 0 p is set to balance the current period profit loss from setting the price higher than its static optimum against the future expected discounted profit gain from reducing the dumping duty that the firm would incur once it becomes subject to a AD duty. When the probability of having such a dumping duty decreases (lower values for Pr), more weight will be given to the current profit loss, inducing the firm to set E 0 p lower, thus closer to its static optimum.
Given that 
Empirical Analysis
The previous theoretical section develops a dynamic pricing model for firms facing U.S. AD duties. In this section, we use detailed data from U.S. AD investigations filed during the 1980-1991 period to test some of the theoretical model's implications.
The data from the cases help us track pricing decisions by the foreign firms in the following ways. First, the assessed AD duty is the difference between the price of the product exported to the U.S. and some measure of "fair" or "normal" value for the product. Thus, the initial AD duty can serve as a benchmark for the level of the U.S. price relative to this normal value. Then, over time, administrative reviews of the dumping margin are conducted and AD duties are recalculated. The new dumping margin (and, hence, new AD duty) reflects changes in difference between the U.S. price of the product and the measure of normal value. To the extent that these changes in AD duties over time reflect changes in the U.S. price only, they give a good measure of dynamic changes in U.S. prices from which we can test implications of the previous theoretical section. As we have already discussed, the assumption that dumping margins are due largely to U.S.
price changes (and not measures of normal value) seems quite reasonable, both intuitively and from the evidence that exists on this matter.
Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
The theoretical implication we examine is with respect to dynamic price changes for firm-product combinations that face AD duties, despite a high ex ante expectation that exemption from AD duties (through a negative injury determination, or a negotiated VER agreement, or etc) would occur. Our theoretical model suggests we are likely to see a large increase in the U.S. price once the such a firm faces the AD duty and hence, these firm-product observations should display much lower future AD duties than other firmproduct observations. To examine this we begin with an empirical model that estimates the factors that determine the likelihood that a firm-product combination will receive a lower AD duty through the administrative review process. Thus, we specify our dependent variable as taking the value of "1" if there is a reduction in the AD duty through administrative reviews within four years subsequent to the case, and "0"
otherwise. The four-year window is chosen because it is long enough to observe the final results of the initial administrative reviews in the case, but hopefully short enough so that underlying market conditions have not substantially altered. We estimate this model with a standard probit estimation procedure.
Within this framework, we test whether a higher ex ante expectation of getting exemption from AD duties is correlated with a higher probability of AD duty reduction through administrative reviews, controlling for other explanatory factors. There are two ways we perform a test of the hypothesis. First, we include additional explanatory variables that proxy for firm-product combinations that would be likely to have ex ante expectations of a VER outcome from an AD investigation. 4 The first additional variable we use is a binary variable indicating whether a product is steel-related or not, since steel products have a history of VER agreements stemming back even before the beginning of our sample. Second, we include a measure of the domestic industry's concentration ratio, with the assumption that successful VER negotiations are more likely with only a few, large firms on the domestic side. Third, we include the import value of the subject product. Since negotiated VERs likely involve substantial costs, we should expect to see
VERs only when the magnitude of the import volume is sufficiently large.
A second method we employ for testing the effect of exemption expectations on AD duty changes is the following two-step estimation procedure. First, we sample all firm-product combinations subject to U.S. AD investigations from 1980-1991 (not just those that went affirmative and received AD duties) and estimate the likelihood of receiving of the case being terminated (which can take the form of a negative injury determination, a withdrawn case through a likely negotiated VER, and etc) using a probit estimation model. From the predicted values, we then construct a binary variable indicating firm-product combinations that are predicted to lead to a terminated case, but instead received AD duties. This binary variable is then used as an explanatory variable in our second stage estimation of the four-year change in the AD duty. As we will see below, both methodologies yield a consistent picture of the effect of high ex ante exemption expectations on dynamic changes in AD duties.
The main control variables we use in the estimation are whether the firm has experience with multinational production and the USDOC's use of "best information available" (BIA) to calculate the original AD duty. Both of these variables proxy for variation in the cost of requesting and receiving fair AD duty calculations across firms involved in these AD cases. Larger multinational firms likely conduct more business in English and keep more detailed internal records of their transactions. Because of this, the cost of providing the necessary accounting data to the USDOC may be substantially less.
For these reasons, we expect that large multinational firms will be more likely to receive lower AD duties through the administrative process.
On the other hand, we expect lower AD duties are less likely in those cases where the USDOC uses BIA. Often foreign firms choose not to respond to USDOC requests for pricing information for determining margins. When this occurs, the USDOC must rely on BIA, which is often data provided by the U.S. petitioning firms. As one would expect AD duty calculations based on BIA tend to be significantly higher. Thus, we take reliance on BIA by USDOC at the time of the initial case as a proxy for high costs of requesting and participating in an administrative review for a particular firm.
Data
Our sample consists of all firm-product combinations subject to U.S. affirmative AD decisions and AD duties for AD investigations filed between 1980 and 1991. Much of the data were initially collected by James DeVault from Federal Register notices and USITC reports connected with each case (See DeVault (1996 for more details on data collection). Information available from these data sources includes firm-specific AD duties both at the time of the initial case, and in subsequent administrative reviews. As discussed, these AD duties are estimated dumping margins and reflect differences in the firm's U.S. price and a definition of "normal" value, which is often the foreign firm's price in its home market.
The evidence from our sample is that there is substantial variation in AD duty changes from administrative review. Out of 430 firm-specific initial AD duties assessed during this period, 306 (71.2 %) were subsequently reviewed at least once. The average change in the AD duty after the first administrative review is from 29.5% to 15.9%, a sizeable decrease. However, there were 54 cases (12.6 %) where the AD duty increased after the first administrative review. From 1980-1984 administrative reviews occurred automatically each year at the anniversary of the case. After 1984, these reviews occurred only if an interested party (a foreign or domestic firm involved in the case) requested a review. However, we assume that any changes in the dumping margin will lead to an administrative review and subsequent change in the AD duty regardless of whether the reviews are automatic or by petition from either side. The reason is that if the dumping margin goes down we would expect the foreign firm asked for a review, whereas if the dumping margin goes up we would expect the domestic side asked for a review. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our estimation.
As indicated, our dependent variable takes the value of "1" if the firm-product received a lower AD duty within four years of the initial AD duty. In our sample, this occurs for nearly 50 percent of the observations. With respect to our explanatory variables, table 1 shows that about 20 percent of our observations are of steel-related products, 37 percent of the observations involved firms with multinational production experience, and in 27 percent of the cases the USDOC used BIA to calculate the initial AD duty. There is also substantial variation in import values and industry concentration across our observations.
Empirical Results
We begin by examining the relationship between initial AD duty and the fouryear change in the AD duty. Column 1 of Table 2 Finally, column 3 of Table 2 reports results from the two-step estimation where we first estimate the probability a case will be terminated from a sample of all firmproduct combinations involved in U.S. AD investigations from 1980-1991, and then include a binary variable indicating a predicted termination as an explanatory variable in our model of AD duty reductions. The results are quite consistent with our specifications in columns 1 and 2: Cases that were predicted to lead to a VER are positively correlated with AD duty reduction. In fact, at the means of the regressors, a predicted VER means a 54 percentage point increase in the likelihood of AD duty reduction. The effects of the control variables are precisely estimated and similar in magnitude to those in column 2.
On a final note, the empirical analysis is still preliminary. Future work intends to pursue the two-step estimation procedure more formally. In addition, we have also examined a model that specifies the dependent variable as the percentage change in the AD duty within four years of the case, rather than a simple binary variable that indicates whether there was a reduction in the AD duty or not. This model yields qualitatively identical results to those we have discussed here.
Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical model under certain enforcement of AD trade policy can explain what are seemingly unreasonable behaviors of foreign firms subject to AD duties: not all the foreign firms try to take advantage of the administrative review process by raising their export prices, thus replacing the AD duties with their increased prices. For the firms that choose to dump in the initial period despite AD duties to follow in the next period, the presence of AD duties will make the inter-temporal tradeoff between the current and the future discounted profits more favorable to dumping behaviors in the next period, yielding constant or higher AD duties through the review process. Introducing uncertain enforcement of AD trade policy generates incentives for the foreign firms to reduce their AD duties through the review process. Once a foreign firm is subject to AD duties despite a high ex ante probability for avoiding such duties, the firm may adjust its prices so that AD duties fall over time in subsequent reviews. The empirical results support the theoretical model by showing that a higher ex ante probability for getting exemption from AD duties is positively correlated with a higher probability for reduction in AD dut ies in the administrative review.
There are various ways to extend the current theoretical model. We can study how different types of uncertainties, like fluctuations in exchange rates or in product demands, affect firms' dynamic pricing under AD trade policy. We can also analyze how the vertical relationship between a foreign exporter and a domestic importer may affect the foreign firm's dynamic pricing path. These theoretical extensions would generate new set of testable predictions on dynamic pricing of firms subject to AD duties. 
